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1COLLABORATION AND THE ECOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY
In the Summer 2009 issue of the Kettering Review, the Charles F. Kettering Foundation began to explore the value of applying complex-systems analysis to the study 
of democracy. In the closing essay in that issue, David Mathews wrote of the “need to know 
more about where there are spaces or opportunities for deliberative decision making and civic 
learning to occur.” As Mathews noted, “We suspect that this is in what we have been calling 
the political wetlands.” Explaining that “the structures and practices of the political wetlands 
are more organic than institutional,” Mathews concluded that “the best strategy for stimulating 
democratic practices is probably to build on what is already ‘growing.’”1
This paper is offered as a contribution to that strategy. Specifically, we will explore various 
democratic features and implications of citizen-driven, multiparty collaboration, viewed as one 
emerging species within the “ecology” of democracy. To anticipate the core of the argument: 
we believe that the kind of problem-solving collaboration we will be examining is democratic 
in the most fundamental sense of that word, because it is nothing more nor less than the effort 
of people to shape the conditions under which they live, rather than leaving that shaping to 
someone else. 
The primary inspiration for this paper is the authors’ practical experience in collaboration, 
politics, and public policy. We also draw on democratic theory, multiparty negotiation theory, 
and a growing literature on collaborative conservation.
We want to be clear at the outset that we are not attempting here to provide a primer on 
collaborative governance, nor a comprehensive analysis of collaborative practices in public land 
and natural resource settings. For a concise and very helpful introduction to the principles of 
1 David Mathews, “Afterthoughts,” Kettering Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer 2009): 69-70.
2collaborative governance, we suggest Chapter 2 of Carmen Sirianni’s Investing in Democracy: 
Engaging Citizens in Collaborative Governance.2 For an overview of the use of collaboration 
in natural resource and public land settings, two good sources are Finding Common Ground: 
Governance and Natural Resources in the American West3 and The Western Confluence: A Guide to 
Governing Natural Resources.4
Before turning  to our analysis of collaboration as an emergent form of democracy, it may be 
helpful to provide an example of what we mean by multiparty collaboration. From the hun-
dreds of readily available instances of citizen collaboration, we offer one from our own part of 
the world. Our intention at this point is not to present this case or its background in detail, 
but simply to provide a brief, concrete example of what we mean when we refer to multiparty 
collaboration.
The National Forest Management Act requires the United States Forest Service to review 
forest plans for each national forest at least every 15 years.5 In keeping with that require-
ment, the Forest Service published a draft of a new forest plan for the Beaverhead-Deerlodge 
National Forest in southwestern Montana in 2006. 
Reactions to the draft plan were mixed, at best. The owners of the locally owned lumber 
mills still operating in the area, already hard-pressed by global competition, were concerned 
that the proposed plan would drive them out of business because it would not allow them 
to harvest enough timber from the national forest to keep their mills running. Conserva-
tionists, on the other hand, were convinced that the proposed plan was short on wilderness 
designation and that the proposed fish and wildlife programs were not protective enough of 
threatened species. 
These conservationists and timber interests had a shared history of deep antagonism, 
in which they had typically taken diametrically opposed positions at public hearings on 
2 Carmen Sirianni, Investing in Democracy: Engaging Citizens in Collaborative Governance (Brookings Institution 
Press, 2009).
3 Ronald D. Brunner, et al., Finding Common Ground: Governance and Natural Resources in the American West (Yale 
University Press, 2002).
4 Matthew McKinney and William Harmon, The Western Confluence: A Guide to Governing Natural Resources 
(Island Press, 2004).
5 National Forest Management Act, U.S. Code 16 (1976) § 1600 et seq.
3anything proposed by the Forest Service. One of those old warriors was Sherm Anderson, 
the founder and owner of Sun Mountain Lumber, Inc. in Deer Lodge, Montana. Anderson 
had spent his life in the timber industry, beginning to drive log trucks when he was 15, and 
eventually, through sheer determination and hard work, creating a business that in good times 
employed over 300 people, including several members of his own family. As the owner of the 
largest business in the county, Anderson was a natural choice to represent his neighbors in the 
state legislature, where his politics were dependably conservative. Serving as president of the 
Montana Logging Association in the 1990s, Anderson spent his fair share of time at public 
hearings, battling the environmentalists who contested nearly every timber sale proposed by 
the Forest Service. In the space of a decade, environmental activism and Forest Service policy 
had reduced the amount of public timber coming into Anderson’s sawmill from 90 percent of 
his feedstock to 5 percent. Those supply problems, coupled with fierce competition from Ca-
nadian mills, had driven a steady stream of small sawmills out of business in the last few years. 
Anderson, operating at a loss even before the bottom dropped out of the housing market in the 
recession of 2008, had every reason to fear that he would be next. That was why the draft forest 
plan, with its further tightening of timber supplies, worried him so much.
One of the people who had battled Anderson in many of those public hearings was Tom 
France, long-time leader and chief litigator for the Northern Rockies office of the National 
Wildlife Federation (NWF). Protecting the habitat of threatened and endangered species like 
grizzly bears and wolves was what NWF members paid France to do, and he had done it 
well. Over the years, he and other environmental advocates had persuaded the Forest Service 
(often by first persuading federal 
judges) that the amount of log-
ging occurring on national forests 
like the Beaverhead-Deerlodge 
was contributing to the decline 
in the population of grizzlies and 
other species. Meanwhile Trout 
Unlimited argued that soil ero-
sion from logging operations 
4degraded trout habitat, while the Montana Wilderness Association pushed for official 
wilderness designation for thousands of acres of national forest land, which would ban timber 
harvesting on those landscapes altogether. To Sherm Anderson, these organizations and the 
people (like Tom France) who ran them had always been the enemy.
But if Anderson had built his business by being tough and persistent, he had also built it 
by being able to adapt to changed circumstances when nothing else would do. Pressed now 
from all sides, he began paying more attention to one change that some other sawmill owners 
were slower to recognize. He saw that some of the most successful environmental advocates, 
not least Tom France, had begun to spend almost as much time talking to their old enemies 
as fighting them. France had been 
a key player in negotiating an 
agreement with some Idaho saw-
mills for an innovative approach 
to grizzly bear management along 
the Idaho-Montana border. If 
working with people like Tom 
France was what it would take to 
keep his mill open, Anderson was 
willing to give it a shot. When he 
signaled that willingness at a con-
gressional hearing in Missoula, both Tim Baker from the Montana Wilderness Association and 
Bruce Farling from Trout Unlimited responded. 
Eventually, representatives from five Montana lumber mills began meeting with local rep-
resentatives from the National Wildlife Federation, the Montana Wilderness Association, and 
Montana Trout Unlimited to explore whether they might collectively find more mutually 
beneficial outcomes for forest management than those being proposed by the Forest Service. 
This collaborative effort became known as the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership. The part-
ners found common ground when some of the conservationists acknowledged that logging 
itself wasn’t necessarily bad for wildlife and water quality, if done in the right way and at the 
right scale. They hammered out ways of fitting fish and wildlife restoration into a sustainable 
 It is this kind of citizen-driven 
problem solving across deep 
ideological and interest group 
divides that we believe has become 
an important, but still emerging 
form of democracy.
5timber harvesting program. The timber interests, meanwhile, were willing to acknowledge 
that substantial portions of the forest should not be logged, but would be better protected as 
wilderness. The Partnership’s laborious collaborative efforts were eventually incorporated into 
legislation introduced by Senator Jon Tester and are currently pending in Congress.6 
It is this kind of citizen-driven problem solving across deep ideological and interest group 
divides that we believe has become an important, but still emerging form of democracy. We 
will provide additional examples as the analysis proceeds. First, though, we need to explain 
what we mean by an “emergent form of democracy.”
 
The concept of emergence derives primarily from complexity theory. In this context, emer-
gence is the process by which systems or patterns arise out of a rich multiplicity (a complexity) 
of relatively simple interactions. Examples of emergent structures range from hurricanes to 
sand dunes to a school of fish swimming or a flock of birds flying in a tight pattern, moving as 
one body. Complexity theorists stress that it is inherently impossible to provide in advance a 
rule or algorithm that will produce the structure or pattern that in fact emerges. Nothing com-
mands the system to form a pattern, let alone this pattern. Instead, the interaction of each part 
with its immediate surroundings (including other parts) results in a complex chain of processes 
that eventually leads to some recognizable pattern or ordered structure. So, for example, Stuart 
Kauffman describes the origin of life itself in these terms:
Life, in this view, is an emergent phenomenon arising as the molecular diversity 
of a prebiotic chemical system increases beyond a threshold of complexity. If true, 
then life is not located in the property of any single molecule—in the details—but 
is a collective property of systems of interacting molecules. . . . Life, in this view, 
is not to be located in its parts, but in the collective emergent properties of the 
whole they create. . . . The collective system is alive. Its parts are just chemicals.7
“Emergence” and the Evolution of Democracy
6 National Forest Jobs and Recreation Act, S 268, 112th Cong., 1st sess. Congressional Record (February 3, 2011):
S 543.
7 Stanley Kauffman, At Home in the Universe (Oxford, 1995), 24.
6Emergent or self-organizing phenomena arise in the social as well as the physical realm. 
Markets, for example, comprise a form of social interaction that seems to arise spontane-
ously out of the inescapable conditions of being human. While individual markets can be 
intentionally created, and while any market can be subjected to externally imposed rules 
and regulations, the market as a feature of human society appears and persists in history 
as something far more akin to self-organizing hurricanes or sand dunes than to intention-
ally manufactured artifacts like clocks or computers. Cities are similarly emergent, seeming 
to come with the territory of human society. And with the city (the polis) comes another 
emergent form of human engage-
ment: politics. 
As with markets or cities, politics 
seem, at some point, to emerge 
naturally out of the human condi-
tion. In order to deal with the range 
of challenges that confront any 
complex human society, decision 
structures and power arrangements 
are inescapable, and certain charac-
teristic forms of these have emerged 
in different settings. By the time Aristotle wrote his Politics, those forms had recurred often 
enough that he could create the same kind of taxonomy of politics that he had developed for 
many dimensions of the natural world. One of those characteristic political forms (not much 
favored by Aristotle) was democracy. This trail of emergent forms, leading from the appearance 
of life itself, to human life, and eventually to the emergence of politics, continues with the long 
and still ongoing evolution of democracy.
In the millennia since its emergence in ancient Greece (and especially in the last two centu-
ries), democracy has become pervasive and well established enough to engender various charac-
teristic forms of its own, including representative democracy, direct democracy of the town hall 
variety, and the kind of plebiscitary democracy manifested in referendum, initiative, and recall 
there is an unbroken  
continuum from the progressive 
emergence of life forms studied  
by evolutionists to the emergence 
of social forms characteristic  
of the human species.
7mechanisms. As the bureaucratic state matured throughout the 20th century, it produced its 
own characteristic set of mechanisms for “participatory democracy,” including public notice 
and hearings, comment periods, and administrative appeals.8 Toward the end of that century, 
a widening desire for more authentically engaged and constructive citizen involvement pro-
duced new, less structured forms of deliberative and collaborative democracy. 
With this thumbnail history of democracy in mind, we will examine some of its major 
developments in terms of the metaphor of an ecology of democracy. Our major objective will 
be to find clues to why and how collaboration has made its appearance in this ecosystem, and 
what challenges and opportunities it may present. 
First, though, it may be helpful to say a word or two about the ecological metaphor 
itself. Is the idea of “political ecology” or “the ecology of democracy” analytically useful, or 
is it only a metaphor? One could argue that no good metaphor (no metaphor “worth its 
salt”) is ever only a metaphor. Useful metaphors establish themselves and persist because of 
some strong, often compelling connection or parallel between the natural phenomenon named 
by the metaphor and the referent phenomenon the metaphor is meant to elucidate. In the 
case of political ecology, it is clearly the world of nature that provides us with the metaphor 
of ecology. But we have already seen that the concept of emergence provides a more-than- 
merely-metaphorical bridge from the world of nature to the political world, since there is an 
unbroken continuum from the progressive emergence of life forms studied by evolutionists to 
the emergence of social forms characteristic of the human species.
In fact, political theory has carried at least hints of this ecological dimension from its 
inception. The very word ecology derives from the Greek word oikos or “household,” and it 
is with the household that Aristotle begins his examination of politics. Assuming that poli-
tics is, as its name implies, simply the organized life of the polis, Aristotle argues that the 
household is the source and model of all politics and that indeed the polis was a naturally 
evolved (or as we might say, an emergent) collection of households, or oikoi. “Hence it is 
evident,” Aristotle writes, “that the polis is a creation of nature, and that humans are by nature 
8 Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern, Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making 
(National Research Council, 2008).
8political animals.”9 Athenian democracy falls far short of any standard we might set for a modern 
democracy, primarily because women and slaves were excluded from the process. Nevertheless, 
the Athenian polity was democratic in the fundamental sense that decisions were made by the 
assembled people, citizens controlled the entire political process, and a large proportion of 
citizens were involved constantly in public business. Pericles put it unforgettably in his funeral 
oration, following an early battle of the Peloponnesian War:
Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a mi-
nority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, 
everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before 
another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a 
particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses.10
If we superimpose our own understanding of how nature works, both in evolutionary 
and emergent terms, on Aristotle’s analysis of the natural origins of politics, we can recognize 
the appearance of Athenian democracy as an adaptive and emergent response to the particu-
lar challenges and opportunities of that time and place. One of those challenges, which any 
regime of any kind faces, is that of legitimacy—how does it ensure that people will obey the 
law? Pericles argues that Athenian democracy meets this test: “We are free and tolerant in our 
private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands our deep 
respect.”11 Concern over legitimacy will follow democracy throughout its historical progress; it 
is, for example, at the heart of Jefferson’s “consent of the governed” argument. We will see that 
it also plays a part in the emergence of collaborative democracy.
Pericles makes another argument for democracy that gets even closer to the theme of 
this paper. “We Athenians,” he reminds his listeners, “do not think that there is an in-
compatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the 
consequences have been properly debated.”12 In evolutionary terms, this would amount to say-
ing that democratic deliberation has significant survival value. We will meet this theme again 
when we discuss the recent emphasis on deliberative and collaborative forms of democracy. 
 
9 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Chapter 2, in: The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (Random House, 1941), 
1129.




9But Pericles’ most impassioned argument runs even deeper: in effect, he argues that 
Athenians are more fully human in every way because they are in charge of their own destinies: 
Taking everything together, then, I declare that our city is an education to Greece, 
and I declare that in my opinion each single one of our citizens, in all the manifold 
aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own per-
son, and do this, moreover, with exceptional grace and exceptional versatility.13 
It was this deeply humanistic dimension of classical Athenian politics that commanded 
the attention of the Renaissance political theorists and practitioners whom we next encounter 
on our rapid transit through political history. Of particular interest for our purposes was a 
theme that we might now call a “prob-
lem in democracy”: what the Florentine 
Renaissance writers, following Aristo-
tle, called the problem of “the one, the 
few, and the many.” In The Machiavel-
lian Moment, J.G.A. Pocock carefully 
traces this theme from ancient Athens 
and Rome to Renaissance Florence, 
England, and finally America. For Ar-
istotle, the ideal political form would 
be the one that brought as fully into play as possible the unique strengths and abilities 
(the “virtues”) of each separate segment or dimension of society. Democracy (“the many”) 
brought to bear the virtues that Pericles so memorably described, but it could also bring 
passions and instability that a well-bred aristocracy (“the few”) were thought to be ideally 
positioned to moderate. And at least in some cases, a single leader (like Pericles) might be 
needed to bring the focused will of “the one” to bear on the challenges facing the polis. In the 
political soil and climate of Renaissance Florence, these ancient ideas sprang to life once again, 
and as Pocock demonstrates, they produced political species that would flourish in revolu-
tionary America, with its peculiar but hardy blending of the interests of the one, the few, and 
the many.
Concern over legitimacy will 
follow democracy throughout 
its historical progress; it is, 
for example, at the heart of 




We are by no means attempting to trace a comprehensive history of democracy here, but 
simply to note how that history has produced the political ecosystem out of which new demo-
cratic forms (like collaboration) might emerge. We began with Aristotle’s contention that “the 
polis is a creation of nature, and that humans are by nature political animals.” This ecological 
dimension of political theory became more explicit during the Enlightenment, especially when 
the French political theorist Montesquieu argued in his classic work The Spirit of the Laws that 
many forms of human society, including political forms, were fundamentally shaped by loca-
tion and even by climatic con-
ditions.14 Not only were po-
litical forms influenced by the 
places that generated them, 
but the republican form de-
pended fundamentally on peo-
ple in a particular place having 
a face-to-face relationship with 
one another. “It is natural for 
a republic to have only a small 
territory,” Montesquieu wrote, 
for in that setting, “the interest 
of the public is more obvious, 
better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen.”15 
Montesquieu’s work was deeply influential with the founders of the American republic. 
Both the defenders and the opponents of the newly drafted U.S. Constitution agreed that 
the nation it established far exceeded the “small territory” that Montesquieu had prescribed. 
Montesquieu’s authority as a political theorist was great enough, however, that James Madi-
son had to go to some lengths in the Federalist Papers to explain how the “extensive republic” 
The birth of the bureaucratic state . . .  
with representative bodies increasingly 
passing regulatory responsibility to 
appointed officials . . . introduced a new 
elite into the matrix of the one, the few, 
and the many, by giving a handful  
of agency experts of various kinds  
a much more prominent role within  
the governing framework. 
14 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book VIII, Chapter 16 (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1906). 
15 Ibid. 
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envisioned by the Constitution could escape Montesquieu’s conclusion that republicanism was 
only suitable for small states.16 
 In fact, Montesquieu had identified a very important feature of the ecology of democracy. 
The Periclean ideal of direct, face-to-face democracy had been, to a large extent, re-created in 
the town meeting democracies of New England, where Montesquieu would undoubtedly have 
agreed that democracy could indeed flourish. But what the Founders and successive genera-
tions of American political leaders had to do in order to make the “extensive republic” work 
was to replace face-to-face democracy with a representative form of government (already well-
developed in England) where the problem of the one, the few, and the many was addressed by 
allowing sovereignty to be exercised by a subset of the people (the few), chosen by the many 
through the mechanism of election. Under representative democracy, elected representatives 
constitute the governing body or bodies and are expected to act in the people’s interest. We 
will return to representative democracy in some depth later, as we examine the relationship of 
collaboration to this dominant life form in the ecology of democracy.
The problem of scale that Montesquieu had posed only deepened as the American republic 
followed its Manifest Destiny westward until it stretched from one coast of the continent to 
the other. Meanwhile, the increasing complexity of 19th-century industrial and commercial 
society challenged the capacity of existing governing institutions to keep up. The end of the 
19th and beginning of the 20th centuries produced a number of significant adaptations to 
these new circumstances. The birth of the bureaucratic state was one inevitable result, with 
representative bodies increasingly passing regulatory responsibility to appointed officials. This 
introduced a new elite into the matrix of the one, the few, and the many, by giving a handful of 
agency experts of various kinds a much more prominent role within the governing framework. 
The Progressive movement championed the cause of expertise with a vengeance, but it also 
contributed to other fundamental changes in the ecology of democracy. Progressivism had 
arisen in large part as a response to the emergence of new forms of economic organization, 
especially corporations operating on a national scale. Progressives urged that political power 
16 Federalist Papers, No. 10 (New York: New American Library, 1961). 
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be mobilized on the same scale in an effort to hold these economic forces democratically 
accountable.17
Meanwhile, another set of progressive reforms gave new levers of power to the many. The 
thoroughly plutocratic nature of the U.S. Senate during the Gilded Age was addressed head-
on by the eventually successful effort to require that senators be elected directly by the people 
rather than by state legislatures. And in many states those legislatures were forced by state 
constitutional amendments to share their law-making powers with the people, in the form of 
initiative and referendum mechanisms.
As it happened, the region where these new forms of direct democracy most strongly 
predominated was also the region that would be most deeply affected by a substantive off-
shoot of the Progressive movement: the protection of millions of acres of Western land from 
settlement, and the establishment of national jurisdiction over these public lands. Here the 
elements of bureaucracy, professional expertise, and national democracy converged, in a blend 
that would become a major seedbed for the later emergence of a new form of democracy: 
citizen-driven collaboration. To understand the genesis of that democratic form, we need to 
take a closer look at how the themes we’ve been examining had evolved by the end of the 20th 
century.
As that century unfolded, the bureaucracies that had begun to emerge during the previous 
century now spread across the governmental landscape. Efforts to keep this growing corps of 
unelected decision makers accountable to the democratic polity produced a steadily thicken-
ing fabric of proceduralism as the century progressed.18 As legislative bodies delegated more 
and more decisions to government agencies, citizens began to feel shut out of those decision 
processes. The Administrative Procedure Act (and its state-level equivalents), and the entire 
17 Among the most compelling arguments for this mobilization of democratic energy and political will on a national 
scale were Herbert Croly’s Promise of American Life (1909) and Theodore Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism” speech in 
Osawatomie, Kansas, on August 31, 1910. One of the (largely unintended) side effects of this focus on national de-
mocracy was a gradual concentration of power in the hands of the president. This development would bring the role 
of the one in the old framework of the one, the few, and the many into play in a new form. By the 1970s, Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. was writing about the “imperial presidency,” and three decades later, Supreme Court nominations 
were turning in part on the nominee’s stand on the theory of the “unitary executive.”
18 Daniel Kemmis, Community and the Politics of Place, Chapter 5 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1990).
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structure of public notice and public hearings with which we are now so familiar constitute an 
effort to democratize the bureaucratic state by guaranteeing citizens the right to participate in 
this crucial range of decision making. “Sunshine laws” and constitutional provisions guarantee-
ing citizens the right to know about and participate in these decisions fit in this same category 
of procedural democracy.19
That solution has only been marginally successful. It works tolerably well as a means of ad-
dressing the realities of a pluralistic society, in that it gives various interests (and interest groups) 
an assortment of opportunities to make their voices heard. It has not been nearly as successful, 
however, in promoting the 
pursuit of the common good. 
The mechanisms of procedur-
al democracy were designed 
to ensure that individual or 
group interests were kept in-
formed of decision processes 
as they unfolded, and that 
they would have an opportu-
nity to express opinions about 
the matter at hand, but those 
mechanisms were never designed to enable those separate voices to find or fashion common 
ground. That was simply not their purpose.
As it turned out, representative democracy itself was undergoing changes that made it bet-
ter at reflecting the increasing pluralism of American society, but at a cost to the pursuit of 
the common good. One reform which on its face seems totally laudable may in fact have been 
a mixed blessing in these terms. The court-imposed “one-person-one-vote” rule was applied 
to representative institutions at all levels of government following the U.S. Supreme Court 
The bureaucracies that had  
begun to emerge during the previous 
century now spread across the 
governmental landscape. . . . As 
legislative bodies delegated more  
and more decisions to government 
agencies, citizens began to feel shut  
out of those decision processes.
19 Many of the features of what we are calling “procedural democracy” were intended to broaden citizen participa-
tion in governmental decision processes. Those features are often referred to as “participatory democracy.” We have 
chosen to reserve that term for the stronger forms of participation found in deliberative and collaborative activities.
We will therefore refer to the cluster of democratic practices described here as “procedural democracy.”
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decisions in Baker v. Carr20 (holding that federal courts had jurisdiction over state reappor-
tionment issues) and Reynolds v. Sims21 (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution demanded “no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all 
citizens”). While this constitutional doctrine resulted in much greater equality among citizens 
in terms of voting power, it had the unintended but often marked side effect of reducing the 
power of place in the electoral process. Whatever else single-member voting districts may be, 
they are very rarely meaningful places in the sense that was so important to republican theorists 
like Montesquieu. When a state legislator says she represents “House District 68,” she is naming 
a bounded territory whose chief characteristic is that it contains the same number of residents 
as every other district in the state. None of the residents of that district ever think of them-
selves as citizens of District 68, 
nor is their behavior in any way 
influenced by that geography. As 
a result, representative institu-
tions, like the bureaucracies they 
had created, became much more 
attuned to interests and ideolo-
gies than to either real places or 
to the common good that arises 
from “common ground.”22
What seemed to have disappeared almost entirely from the democratic landscape of late 
20th-century America was that one fundamental feature of democracy that Pericles had so 
proudly identified in his funeral oration: the power and effectiveness of democratic delibera-
tion. If nature indeed abhors a vacuum, it isn’t surprising that this vacancy began to draw forth 
new life forms, very tentatively at first, and then with increasing urgency and vitality.
One response was the development of various forms of “alternative dispute resolution.” 
Rather than relying exclusively on judicial or administrative mechanisms to resolve disputes, 
Organizations like Public Agenda 
 and Kettering Foundation began to 
experiment with new mechanisms . . .  
to bring the power of citizen  
deliberation to bear on a variety  
of public issues.
20 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
22 See Kemmis, Community and the Politics of Place.
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some disputants began exploring the possibility of resolving them directly, face to face (although 
usually with the assistance of a neutral third-party facilitator or mediator). At first, almost 
no one recognized these developments as having anything at all to do with democracy; they 
were simply new mechanisms for resolving particular disputes. One leader in the field, Law-
rence Susskind, provided a more nuanced view and an incisive analysis of the relationship of 
alternative dispute resolution to deliberative democracy, in an article in Dispute Resolution 
magazine entitled, “Can Public Policy Dispute Resolution Meet the Challenges Set by Delib- 
erative Democracy?” What Susskind has helped us see beneath the surface of alternative 
dispute resolution is that ancient and fundamental democratic truth: given the right circum-
stances, ordinary people have a substantial capacity to overcome differences and discover 
common ground.
If the growing field of alternative dispute resolution did not immediately recognize the 
democratic implications of its work, another emergent set of activities reflected much great-
er awareness of those implications. Beginning in the early 1980s, organizations like Public 
Agenda and Kettering Foundation began to experiment with new mechanisms (especially the 
National Issues Forums, or NIF) to bring the power of citizen deliberation to bear on a variety 
of public issues. Eventually, National Issues Forums were joined by Study Circles (now Every-
day Democracy), by James Fishkin’s practice of deliberative polling, and then by AmericaSpeaks, 
in a cascading emergence of deliberative forums. 
Meanwhile, yet another new democratic life form began to emerge in the open spaces left 
by the older, established democratic forms of representative, procedural, and direct democ- 
racy. Multiparty collaboration partakes of elements of alternative dispute resolution and 
deliberation, but it also exhibits unique features that justify its treatment as a separate species of 
democracy. In terms of the evolving ecology of democracy, collaboration seems to have arisen 
as a direct response to some of the shortcomings of the late 20th-century framework of proce-
dural democracy. Whatever else public hearings might accomplish, they almost never created 
an opportunity for anything resembling democratic problem solving. Yet with increasing fre-
quency, the stakeholders who for decades had battled each other in public hearings began to 
engage in serious, face-to-face, problem-solving work of the kind we described earlier in our 
account of the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership. What has moved so many people to take on 
this hard work of collaboration has been the widespread perception that, in all too many cases, 
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the existing governing framework was proving itself incapable of getting the job done. To put 
it bluntly, the problems that people expected the government to solve were not getting solved.
We are reminded of Pericles’ assertion that Athenians were more successful in solving prob-
lems and devising strategies because they brought many minds and diverse points of view 
together and took the trouble to discuss issues thoroughly before reaching a decision. We 
will argue that it is the marginally greater effectiveness of collaboration that has primarily ac-
counted for its expansion within the ecology of democracy.
But the emergence of collaboration has also brought into focus in a new way the problem 
of scale and the importance of place that had commanded Montesquieu’s attention. In fact, 
the phrase place-based collaboration occurs so frequently in the literature that we have to ask 
whether there is something about collaboration itself that makes it particularly well suited to 
solving place-specific problems. We are not here claiming that a focus on place is a necessary 
condition for meaningful collaboration. But because so much collaborative experience to this 
point has been place-driven, it seems worthwhile to explore what there is about place-focused 
problems that would have produced so much of this emergent democratic form. 
To that end, we turn our attention to the remarkable spread of collaborative practices in 
our own place—the American West—and to a range of collaborative activities arising within 
a setting with which we are personally familiar from our own practical work. That setting is 
characterized by contentious, fairly localized natural resource issues on or near public lands in 
the western United States. Our hope is that, by examining how collaboration has emerged and 
matured in this rather narrow niche within the ecology of democracy, we can develop some 
useful methodologies for studying what catalyzes, enables, constrains, and sustains its existence 
(or what might cause its failure to thrive) in other settings.
There are two especially salient components of this particular niche in political ecology. 
One is literally ecological: these collaborations, without exception, revolve around the uses to 
be made of very specific landscapes and of the soil, water, flora, and fauna of those landscapes. 
Part or all of each of these landscapes consist of public land, usually administered either by 
the U.S. Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Management. In most cases, the parties to the 
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collaboration include, on the one hand, extractive users of the public land in question (timber 
or grazing interests, for example) and on the other, conservationists seeking to protect the land 
or the species inhabiting it. A fundamental feature of the dynamics behind collaboration in 
these cases is the simple fact that different people or interests have different objectives for what 
should happen on one particular piece of ground.
The second key component of this setting is the existing decision-making system that 
constitutes the governing framework for the public lands. This decision structure is breathtak-
ingly complex, comprising a broad range of statutes such as the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), the National Forest Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (NFMA), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 
and the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA).23 These statutes (and many others) 
are fleshed out by a corresponding and even more voluminous set of agency regulations, by 
multiple layers of appeals, including frequent recourse to federal courts, and by the case law 
emerging from that litigation. This is the “procedural republic” in all its glory! 
The increasing problems with this governing framework have been extensively noted and 
analyzed. Former Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, has described the public land gover-
nance system as “the tangled web of overlapping and often contradictory laws and regulations 
under which our federal public lands are managed.”24 Congressman Scott McInnis, former 
chair of the Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, decried “a decision-making apparatus 
that is on the verge of collapsing under its own weight.”25 Former Forest Service Chief Jack 
Ward Thomas calls this governing framework “the blob.”26 In June 2002, Forest Service Chief 
Dale Bosworth presented to Congress a report entitled, “The Process Predicament,” describ-
23 For an in-depth presentation of this statutory framework, see Sarah Bates, The Legal Framework for Cooperative 
Conservation (Public Policy Research Institute, The University of Montana, 2006).
24  Andrus Center for Public Policy, Policy after Politics: How Should the Next Administration Approach Public Land 
Management in the Western States, 2 (June 1, 2000).
25 Conflicting Laws and Regulations—Gridlock on the National Forests: Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Forests and Forest Health of the House Committee on Resources, 107th Cong. (2001).
26 “The Lubrecht Conversations,” Chronicle of Community (Autumn 1998): 9.
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ing the effects of regulatory and administrative gridlock on national forest management.27 The 
report focused heavily on the agency’s increasing inability to fulfill its primary duties. 
Collaborative democracy has emerged so profusely in this setting because many of the people 
with the strongest stakes in the landscapes in question have concluded that the existing decision 
system cannot reconcile those competing stakes as effectively as can the stakeholders them-
selves, acting on their own initiative. This response has been especially prevalent in the vast 
reaches of the West where public lands are so prevalent. Here, in what is often referred to as 
the “public lands West,” we have seen a steadily growing number of local agreements among 
environmentalists, ranchers, loggers, miners, and recreationists about how the public land or 
natural resources should be managed in their particular river drainage area or ecosystem. More 
and more Westerners on both sides of the political fence have come to believe that they can 
do better by their communities, their economies, and their ecosystems by working together 
outside the established, centralized governing framework than by continuing to rely on the 
cumbersome, uncertain, underfunded, and increasingly irrelevant mechanisms of that old 
structure, which had only taught them how to be enemies. 
The collaboration movement is a pragmatic response to the slowly accumulating evidence 
that our historical experiment with proceduralism has had mixed results at best, and at worst, 
simply does not work. It either does not produce good and lasting decisions, or it gets so lost 
in its own procedural maze that it cannot produce any decisions at all. The more statutory and 
regulatory layers that have been added to any particular issue, the denser the maze and the 
higher the likelihood that the system will malfunction around that issue. It is not surprising, 
then, that the public lands West, where more layers have been spread across each other than 
anywhere else, is the place where the search for an alternative decision-making structure has 
been most intense. It is because the existing system is so pervasively and palpably unworkable 
there that Westerners have been willing to put so much work into fashioning an alternative. 
27 U.S. Forest Service, “The Process Predicament: How Statutory, Regulatory and Administrative Factors Affect 
National Forest Management,” http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/documents/Process-Predicament.pdf (accessed June 
2, 2011).
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There is simply too much at stake to let the prevailing system prevail—and consistently fail. 
It is this set of circumstances, above all, that has propelled the collaborative movement in 
the West.
As the collaborative method of resolving public land and resource issues has spread across 
the region, it has come into relationship with the existing governing structure in a number 
of different ways, some of which we will examine in more detail later. But since its earliest 
emergence, this form of democracy has been quintessentially organic. While agencies now 
promote collaboration in a variety of ways, this particular “wetlands of democracy” has not es-
tablished its foothold on the landscape at anyone’s direction or by anyone’s design; in its native 
form, it has been almost entirely 
undirected and has most often 
occurred without any official 
sanction or any clear way of con-
necting to the existing decision 
structure. We will begin our tour 
of this landscape, then, with the 
most feral examples of collabora-
tion and then move on to more 
domesticated instances. 
Jan Brown ran a guest lodge 
in southeastern Idaho, on a blue-ribbon trout stream near Yellowstone Park. Her livelihood 
depended on the fact that there were big trout in the Henry’s Fork of the Snake River and 
that her guests liked to catch them. But the river was threatened from many directions. Cattle 
grazed near it, wearing down the banks that the big fish liked to slip under. State fish and 
game managers allowed more fish to be caught than the population could ultimately sustain. 
Even worse, hydroelectric developers were forever eyeing the river’s swift current, hoping for a 
chance to dam it for the purpose of driving electric turbines.
Since the early 1980s, the Henry’s Fork Foundation (HFF), a nonprofit conservation orga-
nization, had done its best to protect the river. The group’s aggressive advocacy had brought 
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it into direct conflict with area ranchers, as it sought to remove cattle from the public lands 
abutting the river, where the ranchers had grown accustomed to leasing the public land. The 
resentment aroused by this threat to ranchers’ leases was a big part of the working environ-
ment into which Jan Brown stepped when HFF hired her as its executive director in 1991. 
She remembers one public hearing, where a farmer compared her to Saddam Hussein, and 
many hearings and meetings so contentious that they regularly left her sick to her stomach. 
She refused to be daunted, though, and under her leadership, the organization grew to 2,000 
river-loving members, spread across the country and indeed around the world.
That broad-based constituency had enabled HFF to persuade Congress to ban any new hy-
droelectric development on the most cherished stretch of the river, but the organization could 
not prevent the federal Bureau of Reclamation from managing an existing reservoir in a way 
that flushed over 50,000 tons of fish-killing sediment into the river. With fishing so poor, the 
tourist trade took a nosedive that summer, and Jan Brown decided she needed some new allies. 
She turned in a most unexpected direction to find them.
One of the people with whom she had locked horns repeatedly during those stomach-
churning hearings was Dale Swensen, the executive director of the local irrigation district. The 
farmers he represented lived in constant dread that an environmental organization capable 
of banning cattle from the river’s banks might also find a way to prevent them from taking 
water out of the river to irrigate their crops. But all this fighting with the farmers had provided 
Jan Brown with an education in their operations, and she knew they didn’t like the sedi-
ment dump much more than her members did, since that much mud could seriously clog up 
irrigation ditches, not to mention irrigation pipes. Brown took a deep breath and asked Dale 
Swensen what he would think about trying to see whether they might share other common 
or overlapping interests in the river and its management. Swensen agreed to give it a try, and 
before long, he and Jan Brown were cochairing a new organization, the Henry’s Fork Water-
shed Council (HFWC).
Still going strong and still meeting monthly nearly two decades later, the HFWC has steadily, 
persistently, brought together all the competing interests in the watershed—farmers, ranchers, 
anglers, outfitters and guides, environmentalists—providing a forum where they can address 
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whatever new challenges arise on the Henry’s Fork. Operating explicitly on the eminently demo-
cratic maxim that “none of us are as smart as all of us,” the 150 or so members of the council have 
become increasingly skilled at tapping that collective intelligence. Much of this skill rests on pay-
ing closer attention to the details of each others’ interests or operations, as Jan Brown had done 
when she learned how harmful sediment could be to irrigators. A few summers later, Dale Swensen 
learned a similar lesson in reverse when low flows in the river made the water so warm that the 
fish began to die. When Brown 
explained how the fish depend-
ed on cool water, Swensen per-
suaded his irrigation district and 
the Bureau of Reclamation to 
release enough water from the 
cool depths of the reservoir to 
refresh the fish. “Lots of times 
we find that when we get more 
educated, we can set aside philo-
sophical differences and get on 
with things,” Swensen told a re-
porter. “Recently, I was called an 
environmentalist. It was quite a shock to my system.”28 That shock to Swensen’s system might 
be taken as a metaphor for the metamorphosis that such collaborative efforts have wrought in 
watersheds across and beyond the West.
For, in fact, over the last two decades, stories like this have multiplied across the region, 
reaching into nearly every watershed and ecosystem. The Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, 
described earlier, is a fairly typical example of a collaborative effort that arose organically 
and that had its origins outside the established governing structure. An earlier, well-known 
example was provided by the work of the Quincy Library Group in the early 1990s. The detailed 
the henry’s fork watershed council 
has steadily, persistently, brought 
together all the competing interests 
in the watershed—farmers, ranchers, 
anglers, outfitters and guides, 
environmentalists—providing a forum 
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challenges arise on the Henry’s Fork.
28 “Idaho Learns to Share Two Rivers,” High Country News, May 13, 1996.
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history of this group would present individual stories not unlike those we’ve described in the case 
of the Henry’s Fork Watershed Council or the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership. Mutual-
ly dissatisfied with a management plan proposed by the Forest Service, a group of loggers, 
environmentalists, citizens, and local government officials from the area around Quincy, 
California, came up with an alternative 5-year management plan that would preserve old 
growth, endangered species habitat, and roadless areas for 2.5 million acres of forest surround-
ing Quincy, and still keep the town’s local sawmills in business. Unable to persuade the Forest 
Service to adopt the plan, the group enlisted the support of their congressional delegation and 
eventually got their bill through Congress in 1996.
As this kind of citizen-initiated collaboration has gained momentum in the public 
lands and resources arena, government agencies have themselves sometimes been invited to 
become collaborating partners. Consider, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge. This collabor-
ative group of private landowners, federal and state land managers, local government officials, 
and corporate landowners now coordinates much of the management of the Blackfoot River, 
its tributaries and adjacent public and private lands—approximately 2,400 square miles in 
western Montana. The mission of the Blackfoot Challenge, according to its website, is “to 
coordinate efforts that conserve and enhance the natural resources and rural way of life in 
the Blackfoot Watershed for present and future generations.” The Blackfoot Challenge is now 
known nationally as a model for preserving the rural character, ecological health, and natural 
beauty of a watershed. When the Obama administration launched its America’s Great Out-
doors initiative in 2010, it staged its first public event on the ranch owned by Jim Stone, the 
chair of the Blackfoot Challenge board, as a way of underscoring how important the collab-
orative efforts of groups like this have become in the recent history of American conservation. 
To understand how the Challenge gained that reputation, it may be helpful to recount 
the story of the organization’s treasurer, Denny Iverson. Iverson’s parents moved their family 
from Minnesota to the ranch they had bought in the Blackfoot Valley in 1975. He was in high 
school at the time, and he tells how his father, whose dream had long been to own a ranch in 
Montana, turned out not to have much of an idea of how to make this dream ranch pay. As 
Iverson remembers it, he and his brother, Les, “had to work like hell to keep the ranch from 
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going broke.” Iverson was just waiting for the time when he could break free, and even when 
he and his brother bought their parents out in 1991, they agreed that as soon as they could, 
they would sell the ranch. But as Iverson talked about that plan one evening with his wife, 
Charlotte, their two young girls, Courtney and Ashley, suddenly broke in on the conversation. 
“You can’t sell the ranch,” they told their parents. “This is our home!” As he tells the story, this 
expression of passion and determination from his daughters gave him a whole new perspec-
tive on the ranch, and his relation 
to it. “I realized that I was going 
to have to get much more creative 
about how to keep the ranch in-
tact and profitable,” he says. And 
he relates that realization directly 
to his involvement with the Black-
foot Challenge. 
Iverson would not readily have 
chosen to sell the ranch or any part 
of it to a developer, who would 
then subdivide it and sell “ranchettes” to people looking to move to a beautiful mountain set-
ting like this stretch of the Blackfoot. But that kind of subdivision was happening in mountain 
valleys across the West, as more and more ranchers saw it as the best opportunity to either save 
the ranch or pass its value on to their children. The Blackfoot Valley was a prime target for that 
kind of development. No small part of the motivation for creating the Blackfoot Challenge 
had been to help ranchers figure out how to make their ranches pay so that subdividing didn’t 
become their only option. 
Many ranchers were already employing creative ways to preserve their properties. For 
example, like many of their neighbors, one way the Iversons had kept their ranch in the black 
was by leasing some of the surrounding public land for their cattle to graze on. As with hun-
dreds of other ranchers across the West, the profitability of their ranch depended in part on 
the availability of those leases. But public land grazing had become a target of several national 
As this kind of citizen-initiated 
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environmental groups, and unless grazing could be done in an environmentally benign way, 
the threat that their leases would not be renewed hung like Damocles’ sword over ranchers’ 
heads as it had along the Henry’s Fork.
Another way the Iversons had kept their ranch solvent was by spending a fair amount of 
time in the woods, supplying timber to local sawmills. Some of that timber came from private 
land, like their ranch, but some of it also came from Forest Service land. As with public land 
grazing, some national environmental groups were seeking to end all commercial harvesting of 
timber from public land. If suc-
cessful, those efforts would reduce 
the thin margin that enabled the 
Iverson ranch to support the fam-
ily. Whether it was grazing or log-
ging, then, the Iversons and their 
neighbors (including the neigh-
boring sawmills) were learning 
that they had to become conser-
vationists if they were to preserve 
their way of life. It is primarily 
the Blackfoot Challenge that has 
enabled them to do that. Above 
all, it has given them a new way of working with conservation organizations like the Nature 
Conservancy or Trout Unlimited and with government agencies like the Forest Service.
Both federal and state land management agencies have seats on the board of the Blackfoot 
Challenge, so Denny Iverson spends a lot of time working with them. When we asked him 
whether his involvement with this collaborative group had changed his view of government 
at all, Iverson said, “It’s changed it in a big way. Before, I was just trying to scratch a living 
out of the ground. I was a pretty right-wing conservative, with very little use for government, 
especially the federal government.” He hasn’t changed any of his principles, but he says he’s 
More clearly than is evident  
in some similar efforts around  
the American West, this  
“coalition of the unalike” in  
the Blackfoot Valley has 
concluded that the best way  
to realize the promise of its hard 
work is through the existing 
decision-making system.
25
“more middle of the road now, because I’ve learned how government works—or maybe more 
important, how it can work.” Part of the change in his view of government, he says, is that the 
agencies he works with have also changed as a result of their involvement with the Challenge. 
“They’ve become more efficient, more responsive,” he says. For his part, Iverson sees that his 
involvement with the Blackfoot Challenge has enabled him to “sit down with agency folks, and 
I’ve learned that they’re just pretty much like me or my neighbors. Their moms die; their kids 
play soccer. When the meeting’s over, we’ll buy them a beer. In fact, we’d never have gotten to 
know each other so well if we hadn’t started going to Trixie’s Antler Saloon together.” 
It’s doubtful that they talk about the Blackfoot Challenge’s mission statement at Trixie’s, 
but Denny Iverson’s story, going back to the day the girls said, “You can’t sell the ranch; this is 
our home!” is the kind of story that gives meaning to that mission: “To coordinate efforts that 
conserve and enhance the natural resources and rural way of life in the Blackfoot Watershed 
for present and future generations.”
Here again, then, as with the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, the Henry’s Fork 
Watershed Council, or the Quincy Library Group, a diverse group of citizens has taken the 
initiative to conserve a place that is near and dear to their hearts. More clearly than is evident 
in some similar efforts around the American West, however, this “coalition of the unalike” in 
the Blackfoot Valley has concluded that the best way to realize the promise of its hard work is 
through the existing decision-making system—which means that the collaborating partners 
have sought to engage the people and institutions that have the formal authority to adopt and 
implement their proposals.
In contrast to this citizen-driven type of collaboration, public land management agencies 
themselves now routinely invite or encourage collaboration among various stakeholders. To 
illustrate this type of collaboration, consider the ongoing process to develop a new planning 
rule for the U.S. Forest Service. The National Forest Management Act, which governs land 
and resource management in the national forests, requires the agency to develop plans for all 
national forests and grasslands. The agency adopted the first set of rules to guide the develop-
ment of these plans in 1979. The planning rules were revised in 1982. Since then, there have 
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been four attempts to revise and update the rules, but they have all failed. Thus, all existing 
forest plans have been developed under the aegis of the 1982 rule.
In 2009, at the direction of the Obama administration, the U.S. Forest Service launched 
yet another effort to revise and update the planning rule. Collaboration has been a hallmark 
of this new process. According to the official website, “The Forest Service is committed to 
developing a new planning rule that endures over time. We believe a transparent and 
participatory method is the best way to accomplish this. We’ll be working hard to gather input 
collaboratively throughout the development of a new planning rule.” 
This approach to rulemaking is an example of how government agencies now frequently 
use collaboration. In this case it is being used to develop administrative rules, but agencies 
also increasingly use collaboration to develop policy proposals, management plans, and site- 
specific work plans.29 In some situations, collaboration is now even mandated by Congress.30 The 
government’s use of collaboration is not limited to natural resources and environmental policy 
and is increasingly invoked at every level—local, state, and federal—to formulate (via the 
legislative branch) and implement (via the executive branch) public policy.
These government-sponsored efforts are a welcome addition to the ecology of democracy. 
However, they represent a qualitatively different kind of collaboration than the type of citizen-
initiated collaboration illustrated by the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership or the Blackfoot 
Challenge. Our experience has convinced us that, at least in the public lands arena, collabora-
tion would never have been widely employed by agencies, let alone mandated by legislative 
bodies, had it not initially emerged in a completely organic, nondirected way and if it had not 
proven its viability on the challenging political landscape that produced it. It is this organic, 
citizen-initiated form of collaboration, reflective of David Mathews’ “wetlands of self-rule,” 
that we mean when we speak of “collaborative democracy.”
29 See the USIECR website for cases on the variety of ways in which collaboration is used on other natural 
resource and environmental issues.
30 Sarah Bates Van de Wetering and Matthew McKinney, “The Role of Mandatory Dispute Resolution in Federal 
Environmental Law: Lessons from the Clean Air Act,” Journal of Environmental Law & Litigation 21(1) (2006): 
1-45.
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Having outlined the widespread emergence of multiparty collaboration in one particular 
part of the country and one issue arena, we can now more fruitfully ask some key questions 
that have been hovering in the background. Why view collaboration as a form of democracy 
at all? And if it is a species of democracy, what kind of democracy is it, and how does it relate 
to other democratic forms? Our answers to these questions are once again informed substan-
tially by our experience of watching the rise and spread of collaboration as a problem-solving 
approach in the particular settings described earlier. Whether the problem is how to keep the 
water in the Henry’s Fork cool enough for the fish or abundant enough for the farmers, how to 
continue harvesting enough timber in the Beaverhead to keep the sawmill in Deer Lodge oper-
ating, or how to help ranchers in the Blackfoot earn enough to avoid subdividing their ranches, 
these collaborations are always and everywhere about solving real, immediate, on-the-ground 
problems. Our experience has convinced us that the one thing that has contributed most sig-
nificantly to the steady expansion of the use of collaborative problem solving is the fact that, in 
so many circumstances, it works, and, in fact, it works better than other available democratic 
mechanisms. In evolutionary terms, this is a straightforward example of natural selection: what 
works well survives and thrives. Collaboration has gained a foothold in certain niches of our 
political ecology because it has brought a kind of selective advantage to those settings.
This element of adaptiveness becomes more striking when we consider the myriad factors 
that militate against collaboration. For example:
•  Most of the parties to collaborative efforts have spent years using more  
adversarial means of dealing with the kinds of issues they now seek to ad-
dress collaboratively. This is a new, unfamiliar, and often intimidating way of 
proceeding.
• It requires learning to deal in a new way with people you have spent years 
treating (and thinking of ) as enemies.
• It subjects those who make this leap to suspicion, if not outright hostility, 
from other members of their own “tribe.”
• Successful collaborative efforts are almost always very time-consuming.
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• The established decision system rarely provides any space or encouragement  
for collaboration.
• Even highly productive collaborations are often overturned by the established 
system.
The survival, and indeed the spread of collaboration against these barriers, is a vivid 
testament to its effectiveness. And it is in the context of this harsh, putting-to-the-test 
environment that the democratic cre-
dentials of collaboration have been 
established. People only go to all the 
trouble that collaboration entails be-
cause they have a real and substantial 
stake in the matter at hand, and pre-
sumably no better means of advancing 
their interests. Their work is therefore 
democratic in the most fundamental 
meaning of that word: it is the dead-
serious, determined effort of people to 
shape the conditions under which they 
live, rather than leaving that shaping to 
someone else.
If collaboration is, at its core, an exercise in democratic self-determination, one important 
set of questions immediately arises: how does collaboration relate to other, more familiar forms 
of democracy? 
Collaborative, deliberative,  and direct democracy. As we noted earlier, collaborative and 
deliberative democracy are relative newcomers to the ecology of democracy. Both have the 
potential to contribute significantly to the practice of democratic citizenship. These two forms 
of democratic practice are sometimes regarded as synonymous, and indeed there is substantial 
overlap between them. At a minimum, collaboration cannot work without a heavy dose of 
deliberation. It is only by employing many of the techniques and skills of  deliberation that col-
laborative stakeholders have any chance of finding mutually satisfactory solutions to the very 
challenging problems they so often take on. A clearheaded, unbiased framing of the key issues 
It is only by employing many of  
the techniques and skills of  
deliberation that collaborative 
stakeholders have any chance 
of finding mutually satisfactory 
solutions to the very challenging 
problems they so often take on.
29
is indispensable, for example, and this often requires reframing the issue in different terms 
than it may have presented within the established, adversarial framework. In the case of the 
Pawcatuck Borderlands of Rhode Island and Connecticut, for example, The Nature Conser-
vancy initially defined the scope of a proposed regional conservation project in terms of forest 
cover, its primary conservation interest. During subsequent conversations, other stakeholders 
argued that watersheds and commute-sheds were more appropriate benchmarks for defining 
the region. After a healthy round of dialogue, deliberation, and reframing, the participants 
eventually agreed that the boundaries of the Borderlands would vary depending on the specific 
issue and interests in question. 
Collaboration also depends on many of the same communication skills familiar to the prac-
tice of deliberation. Collaborative efforts around contentious problems will never get off the 
ground unless the parties are able to hear and, in some sense, appreciate one another’s perspec-
tives and, above all, one another’s core interests. Something like appreciative inquiry, then, is of 
fundamental importance in both deliberative and collaborative settings.31 Along with it must 
come a genuine open-mindedness, a willingness to entertain new ideas from people one might 
once have thought incapable of producing good ideas. This is exactly what we’ve encountered 
in the stories of Jan Brown and Dale Swensen on the Henry’s Fork, or of Sherm Anderson and 
Tom France in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge, and it’s what we would encounter if we could dig 
into the personal stories behind any meaningful collaboration. In every case, a key ingredi-
ent of the success of the collaboration has been the unexpected experience of understanding 
more of the details of one’s neighbor’s (or one’s former adversary’s) concerns or operations, and 
reaching within oneself to find ways of addressing those concerns without sacrificing one’s own 
interests. In short, collaboration is, to a substantial extent, a deliberative practice, and one that 
calls to mind the advantages to governing effectiveness and human satisfaction that Pericles 
claimed for Athenian democracy. 
In these terms, both deliberative and collaborative democracy stand in fairly sharp contrast 
to direct democracy in its most prevalent modern forms of initiative and referendum. One of 
the most compelling criticisms of these plebiscites is the fact that they present voters with a 
stark, either-or choice. Either you are for the proposition as presented, or you are against it. 
31 See David L. Cooperrider and Diana Whitney, Collaborating for Change: Appreciative Inquiry (Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers 1999).
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Once an issue is placed on the ballot, it can be debated, but there is no room for deliberation 
or collaboration. It is true that ballot initiatives could (and occasionally do) emerge from a de-
liberative or collaborative process, but in most cases ballot issues are crafted by interest groups 
at one end of the ideological spectrum or the other, and thus become part of the adversarial 
political system. It would be worth tracking whether deliberative or collaborative processes are 
becoming more common at the front end of these forms of direct democracy, since there is 
certainly no room for them at the back end, when the voting occurs.
While deliberative and collaborative democracy are similar in some ways, and stand in 
a similar relationship to direct democracy, there are also significant differences between delib-
eration and collaboration. To under-
stand the strengths and weaknesses 
of either collaborative or delibera-
tive democracy, it is important to 
understand their different origins 
and modes of operation. One dif-
ference is reflected in the nearly uni-
versal use of the term stakeholder to 
describe the parties to collaborative 
efforts. This is far more than a matter 
of semantics; indeed it relates directly 
to what we have identified as the one 
feature of collaboration that most 
clearly establishes its democratic credentials. Collaboration has secured its foothold in the ecol-
ogy of democracy, against all the barriers it faces, because the people who have developed the 
practice of collaboration have, without exception, had a real and substantial stake in the matter 
at hand. Those people do not operate out of a merely casual or abstract interest in the problem 
they are seeking to resolve. They have enough individual or group interest immediately at stake 
to get them to the table and keep them there. 
This suggests one possible difference between deliberation and collaboration, which might 
be framed as the distinction between simply discussing issues and actually solving problems. 
Collaboration is inherently focused on solving immediate, concrete problems, while delibera-
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tive democracy, at least in its early stages, was often focused on a more abstract, less action- 
oriented discussion of issues. In recent years, though, the field of deliberative democracy has 
itself moved steadily toward more practical problem-solving methods of engagement. The 
change is at least symbolically reflected in the change of the name of Study Circles to Every-
day Democracy. The National Issues Forums Institute has also broadened its work to provide 
more tools to local groups and communities seeking to use deliberative methods to address 
local problems that the existing decision structure has failed to resolve. And from its inception, 
AmericaSpeaks has been assiduous in its efforts to legitimize its projects by engaging decision 
makers up front and throughout the process. 
It should also be noted that, within the domain of deliberative democracy, distinctions 
have been drawn that can make certain forms of deliberation look much more like the kind 
of collaboration we have been discussing. In particular, Noëlle McAfee has developed a typol-
ogy of deliberative theories that is both incisive and highly relevant to our topic.32 McAfee 
identifies three strains of deliberative theory, which she names the preference-based, the ratio-
nal proceduralist, and the integrative models. She evaluates each of these models in terms of its 
contribution to democratic practice.
A leading example of the preference-based model is the deliberative polling procedure 
developed by James Fishkin.33 As McAfee explains, “This model offers policymakers a snapshot 
of what a deliberative public thinks.” She argues, though, that this public is still made up of 
individuals who bring to the table only their individual preferences. Deliberation may enable 
the individuals to reexamine and restate their preferences in response to what they have heard 
from their neighbors, but the outcome is still comprised of individual (as opposed to collec-
tive) preferences. 
In the rational proceduralist model, on the other hand, “citizens are guided to come 
up with universalizable norms.”34 This view of deliberation is fundamentally Kantian, with 
20th-century roots in the work of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. According to McAfee, 
“In this model, deliberation is a way in which individuals collectively decide whether a policy is 
legitimate.35 McAfee criticizes this model for what might be called its political naiveté:
32 Noëlle McAfee, “Three Models of Democratic Deliberation,” in Public Thought and Foreign Policy, ed. by 
Robert J. Kingston (Kettering Foundation Press, 2005).
33 James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (Yale University Press, 
1991).
34 McAfee, op. cit., 96.
35 Ibid., 97. Emphasis in the original.
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This model seems to lose sight of the reason people enter into public delibera-
tions—because their communities are wracked by problems that politicians cannot 
seem to solve. In actual community deliberations, participants are not looking for 
which claim is normatively right, but which picture of the problem is most telling, 
and which courses of action have promise.36
McAfee sees in the integrative model of deliberation a solution to the democratic deficien-
cies of the other two models. She traces the intellectual origins of this model from John Dewey 
and Hannah Arendt to Benjamin Barber, Daniel Yankelovich, and David Mathews. McAfee 
focuses on NIF37 as a leading example of this form of deliberation.
McAfee describes her own work with Mathews in developing NIF discussion guides. Draw-
ing on Yankelovich’s theory of deliberation as “choice work,” she explains that “the aim was 
for citizens to consider an array of policy options, and, on each one, to spell out the costs and 
consequences of each approach as well as the trade-offs that would need to be made if any one 
approach were adopted.”38 McAfee then takes her description of the integrative model a step 
further and a step deeper into democratic theory:
The public dimension of deliberation is indispensable to the task of fathoming 
problems and forming a public that can respond. Instead of seeing politics as bar-
gaining about preferences, [deliberating citizens] see politics as a difficult matter 
of deciding what kinds of communities they are making for themselves. Instead of 
merely preferring, deliberators choose.39
Conceptually, at least, McAfee has pinpointed the democratic center of gravity of a 
deliberative process like the National Issues Forums. “In the integrative model,” she writes, 
“participants are motivated by their sociality to meet with others they may neither like nor 
understand in order to find solutions to problems that vex what they do care about dearly, 
the public world that they all inhabit, the world they will leave for their children and future 
generations.”40 Language like this describes precisely what motivates citizens to engage in the 
collaborative processes we have been discussing, and it identifies the fundamentally democratic 
motivation behind that collaboration. 
36  Ibid., 98.
37 See http://www.nifi.org (accessed June 2, 2011).
38 McAfee, 100.
39 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
40 Ibid., 104.
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In these terms, McAfee’s analysis raises two questions for us. First, her description of the 
integrative model of deliberation would challenge our distinction between deliberation as 
being focused on discussing issues, while collaboration focuses on actual problem solving. 
But to what extent does McAfee’s integrative model actually describe what happens in delib-
erative processes like NIF? Do participants in those forums see themselves as attempting to 
solve concrete problems, or do they perceive themselves as being engaged in a more abstract 
exercise? We are not familiar enough with this format to venture an answer to that question; 
rather, it is posed as a very explicitly 
open question. What we do know is 
that the deliberative forum original-
ly called Study Circles changed its 
name in 2008 to Everyday Democ-
racy, in what one analyst describes 
as an effort “to reflect its increased 
attention to collective action and 
public problem solving.”41 This may 
reflect a more widespread shift in 
the field of deliberative democracy 
in the direction of actual problem 
solving.
Meanwhile, McAfee’s essay also opens up the question of how any form of deliberation 
connects with representative government. She writes, for example, that the integrative model 
of deliberation “understands that deliberators want to have a hand in shaping policy, indeed 
that the ‘shaping’ is central to deliberation itself.”42 Again, this gets to the democratic heart of 
the matter, but it also begs the question of how these deliberating citizens are going to shape 
public policy. That has been and continues to be a vexing question within the field of delibera-
tive democracy. For our purposes here, what matters is that it is also a live issue within collab-
orative democracy. What we will argue is that the key role of stakeholding within collaborative 
processes enables collaboration to engage more effectively with the representative system than 
most deliberative processes have managed to do. 
The deliberative forum originally 
called Study Circles changed its 
name in 2008 to Everyday Democracy, 
in what one analyst describes as 
an effort “to reflect its increased 
attention to collective action and 
public problem solving.”
41 “Everyday Democracy” in Participedia at http://www.participedia.net/wiki/Everyday_Democracy 
(accessed June 2, 2011).
42 Ibid., 102.
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Collaborative, representative, and procedural democracy. In the public land and natu-
ral resource arena, where we have witnessed so much collaborative work over the past several 
years, there is an ongoing debate about how these collaborative activities fit, don’t fit, or should 
fit into the statutorily constructed decision-making framework that has been established in 
this arena. One strongly held point of view has been deeply hostile to the use of collaborative 
processes in this field. Thus, for example, Michael McCloskey, the longtime executive director 
and later board chair of the Sierra Club wrote in 1995 to his board: “A new dogma is emerging 
as a challenge to us. It embodies the proposition that the best way for the public to determine 
how to manage its interest in the environment is through collaboration among stakeholders, 
not through normal governmental processes.”43 George Coggins, a leading authority on en-
vironmental law, put the matter in equally stark terms: “The federal government is the only 
federal government we have. It owns the federal lands and resources and it must be responsible 
for allocating them in the fashion that a national majority—not a local group or partnership—
deems appropriate.”44
In Coggins’ view (and he is by no means alone), there is one legitimate form of democratic 
decision making in this arena, namely the representative system established by the U.S. Con-
stitution. Congress, in turn, has established certain avenues for participation in the public 
lands arena, including statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest 
Management Act, and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. These, and the regula-
tions adopted under them, establish clearly defined means by which any American citizen can 
have a say in the decision making of the agencies that Congress has authorized to manage these 
public lands and resources. This process of providing input and advice to designated decision 
makers, both elected representatives and appointed agency officials, is the legitimate, legally 
constituted framework for democratic participation in this arena. It is therefore not surprising 
that some people have viewed the intervention of self-appointed stakeholders with suspicion 
or outright hostility.
This resistance to the widespread use of collaboration in the public lands arena is height-
ened, and its democratic point is sharpened, by the often-repeated reminder that these lands 
and resources belong to all the people in the United States, while many of the collaborative 
43 Michael McCloskey, Memorandum to Sierra Club Board of Directors, reprinted in High Country News, 28, 
No. 9, May 13, 1996.
44 George Cameron Coggins, “Of Californicators, Quislings and Crazies: Some Perils of Devolved Collaboration,” 
Chronicle of Community, vol. 2 no. 2 (Winter 1998): 30.
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“The public lands are public. They 
are the property of all of the 
people, not just those who live 
in their immediate vicinity. They 
are national assets, not local 
storehouses to be looted in the 
deregulation riots.”
groups seeking to resolve conflicts around the public lands are drawn from the locality in ques-
tion. As George Coggins puts it with his customary flair: “The public lands are public. They are 
the property of all of the people, not just those who live in their immediate vicinity. They are na-
tional assets, not local storehouses to be looted in the deregulation riots.”45 Coggins’ hyperbole 
aside, the tension between duly constituted national democracy on the one hand and a largely 
extralegal and highly localized form of collaborative democracy on the other has to be given 
serious consideration. In a sense, this is another instance of the age-old problem of the one, the 
few, and the many, with people like Coggins arguing that local collaborations around public 
land issues amount to a few self-appointed local citizens taking into their own hands democrat-
ic activities that rightly belong to the many. If it were not for the persistence and the frequent 
productiveness of these collaborative 
efforts, they might simply be dis-
missed as extraneous and corrosive 
to the established democratic sys-
tem. But they do persist, and they 
persist largely because they work.46 
That simple fact mandates a closer 
look at the legal and institutional 
landscape within which collabora-
tion has so aggressively established 
itself.
If those perceptions were confined to one end of the political spectrum or the other, they 
might be more easily dismissed, but since collaboration, by its nature, requires the partici-
pation of a broad range of stakeholders, it is necessary to take the sometimes implicit but 
clearly broad-based criticism of the established system more seriously. This is not an appropri-
ate venue for examining in detail the particular shortcomings of that system that have given so 
much impetus to the collaborative alternative, but it does suggest the value of further research 




45 George Coggins, “Devolution in Federal and Land Law: Abdication by any other name . . . ” Hastings West-
Northwest Journal of Environmental Law Vol. 3 (Winter 1996): 213. 
46 On the success of collaborative efforts focused on public lands and resources in the Rocky Mountain West, 
see Matthew McKinney and Patrick Field, “Evaluating Community-Based Collaboration on Federal Land and 
Resources,” Society and Natural Resources, 21:5 (2008): 419-429.
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framework in any policy arena play in the emergence of collaboration in that arena. In the 
public land and resource context, they have clearly played a major role, but whether that is a 
universal component of the ecology of collaboration is a matter for further study.
Turning from the genesis to the results of collaboration, public land and resource 
issues provide further grist for the examination of the relationship between collaborative 
and representative democracy. Because collaboration has often produced good results, it has 
sometimes led to the drafting and occasionally the adoption of specific legislation. A well-known 
example was provided by the work of the Quincy Library Group, described earlier, which 
resulted in congressional action to implement the collaborative group’s work. In 2002, then 
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle successfully sponsored legislation enacting the results of a 
similar collaboration on the Black Hills National Forest in South Dakota. Currently, Montana 
Senator Jon Tester is sponsoring legislation that would give statutory approval to three separate 
collaboratively produced forest plans in Montana. While none of this legislation has been free 
of legitimate criticism, it does show the potential for a fruitful intersection of collaborative and 
representative democracy, at least under certain circumstances.47
A major factor in the success of any of this legislation has been the fact that so many 
varied interests, deeply committed to the results of their collaborative work, have provided the 
political will to secure statutory approval for that work. Both halves of this formula contribute 
to the result. Passion and commitment from one end of the political spectrum will rarely carry 
the day, but neither will a broad consensus arising out of abstract or academic discussions. 
When collaboration bears fruit in the political arena, it is because it brings to that arena both 
the breadth of the collaborative partnerships and the fact that all the partners have so much 
at stake.
In spite of these examples, the translation of place-specific collaborative results into legis-
lation remains more problematic than otherwise. One observer has noted, for example that 
“if replicated more broadly, the place-based approach to forest management could further 
disaggregate the national forest system.”48 This concern was echoed by Undersecretary of 
Agriculture Harris Sherman when he testified on Senator Tester’s bill to the effect that it 
“establishes a potentially harmful precedent because it may lead to multiple site specific legisla-
 
47 See the results of the study by McKinney and Field and the observations on how the role of government and 
technical experts is being reformed. 
48 Martin Nie, “Place-Based Legislation as a Method of Resolving Multiple-Use Conflicts on National Forests,” 
Ecology Law Quarterly, 37(1) (2010). 
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tive efforts transferring much needed resources from other units of the National Forest System 
where priority work must also be accomplished.”49 Here again, the difficulty may be viewed as 
a manifestation of the old problem of the few and the many. This may be where collaboration 
could benefit from the addition of some of the well-developed forms of democratic delibera-
tion. If the perspective of a more broadly representative, but genuinely deliberative, public 
could be brought to bear on some of these situations, it could expand the range of public 
involvement without necessarily losing the problem-solving impetus that had led to the col-
laborative solution in the first place.
If the enactment into legislation of place-based collaborative results is both promising and 
problematic, another way of combining collaborative and representative democracy (namely 
the mandating of collaboration) is also double-edged. One of the strongest tributes to the 
effectiveness of collaboration in the public land and resource arena is the fact that the prac-
tice itself is more and more often blessed, if not mandated, by both statutes and agency rules 
and procedures.50 One good statutory example is the Valles Caldera Trust. In 2000, Con-
gress acquired the privately owned Baca Ranch in northern New Mexico. Instead of giving 
one of the existing land management agencies responsibility for this newly acquired public 
land, Congress mandated that “an experimental management regime should be provided by 
the establishment of a Trust capable of using new methods of public land management that 
may prove cost-effective and environmentally sensitive.”51 Specifically, Congress established a 
diverse, multiparty governing board for the land, and in effect mandated that it be managed 
collaboratively. Three years later, in the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Congress 
again called collaboration into play as it sought to “reduce wildfire risk to communities, munic-
ipal water supplies, and other at-risk Federal land through a collaborative process of planning, 
prioritizing, and implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects.”52
Many other examples of statutory and regulatory mandating or encouragement of collabor-
ative approaches to public land management could be listed, all adding up to a clear recognition 
 
49  Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Public Lands 
and Forests (December 17, 2009).
50 On the merits of mandating collaboration in federal natural resource and environmental policy, see Bates Van 
de Wetering and McKinney, “The Role of Mandatory Dispute Resolution in Federal Environmental Law: Lessons 
from the Clean Air Act.” 
51Valles Caldera Preservation Act (Public Law 106-248) 16 U.S.C. 460l–9.
52 Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-148). 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.
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that this form of problem solving has repeatedly proven its usefulness in this arena. That useful-
ness is further documented by the McKinney and Field study, which concluded that the role 
of government is changing in the context of collaborative problem solving. While government 
becomes more of an enabler and resource, most collaborative groups still need government 
to provide resources and technical expertise and recognize that established decision-making 
channels—both administrative and legislative—are still the only way to implement changes 
in public policy.
Encouraging as this trend of 
governmental adoption of col-
laborative methods may be, it 
does also raise questions about 
how readily collaboration can 
be transposed into settings that 
vary substantially from those 
in which it emerged. To extend 
the ecological metaphor a step 
further, these efforts to cre-
ate or encourage collaborative 
approaches to public land and 
resource issues by the use of leg-
islation or administrative prac-
tice could be viewed as the equivalent of domesticating animals or plants that had originally 
emerged and evolved in the wild. Useful and often lovable as these domesticated strains can be, 
it nevertheless remains true that a dog is not a wolf, nor a cat a tiger. Even while we promote 
and encourage collaboration in a number of constrained institutional settings, there are sound 
arguments for preserving space, and if possible native habitat, within which collaborative 
democracy can continue to flourish and evolve in its own organic, nondirected way.
In fact, over the past decade or so, there have been a number of proposals for the estab-
lishment of formal experimental frameworks in the public land and resource arena. A major 
motivation behind these proposals is to maintain space for the continued development and 
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government to provide resources  
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implement changes in public policy.
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exploration of organically generated collaborative processes. Two examples are the Region 7 
proposal and a more recent proposal to create a competitive grants program to promote large-
landscape conservation.
Region 7 is a proposed initiative that would facilitate experimentation and collaboration on 
national forest lands.53 Because of past regional consolidation, there has not been a Region 7 in 
the national forest system since 1965. This nongeographical region would house experimental 
projects on national forest lands, testing new, innovative approaches to forest management 
while focusing on collaborative governance structures and other mechanisms to overcome 
some of the problems that now beset the current system of national forest governance. Such 
an experimental approach would not attempt to change the entire national forest system but 
would recognize problems and invite and test innovative solutions in a few carefully chosen 
settings. 
The first step would be to conduct a national competition for the selection of experimental 
projects to test new models of management or governance. A blue-ribbon commission would 
be organized to solicit proposals for alternative approaches to public land management and 
governance, select promising projects, and guide the implementation process. The projects 
selected would make up the new Region 7. 
Meanwhile, a recent policy report from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy has 
recommended a competitive grants program to encourage collaboration in the arena of large- 
landscape conservation.54 To participate in the national competition, regions—as defined 
by stakeholders, including agency officials—would complete a strategic assessment that (1) 
explains their needs, interests, objectives, and current practices relative to six key issues: 
biological diversity, ecosystem services, economic vitality, community resilience, amenities, 
and climate change; (2) demonstrates their civic, political, and organizational capacity to work 
across boundaries; and (3) articulates a plan to measure progress, adapt strategies as appropri-
ate, and sustain the enterprise over time. 
53 See Daniel Kemmis, “Region 7: An Innovative Approach to Planning on or Near Public Lands,” American Land 
Use Law and Zoning Digest, Vol. 55, No. 8 (August 2003).
54 Matthew McKinney, Lynn Scarlett, and Daniel Kemmis, Large Landscape Conservation: A Strategic Framework 
for Policy and Action (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2010).
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The commission would review, evaluate, and select the most promising efforts using the 
following criteria: creativity and novelty in conception; strategic significance; measurable 
effectiveness; transferability across jurisdictions; and the ability to endure over time. 
Once selected, regions would prepare a large-landscape conservation strategy consistent 
with their initial strategic assessment. In return for their participation, regional coalitions 
would be eligible for federal matching grants that could be used in a flexible way to develop 
and implement large-landscape conservation plans, including convening and coordinating 
multiparty dialogues, sustaining governance processes, and supporting ecosystem restoration, 
land acquisition, youth conservation programs, recreational access, and so on. 
These experimental proposals, with their deliberately open-ended results, call to mind once 
again David Mathews’ evocation of the “wetlands of self-rule.” One of the reasons we choose 
to preserve wetlands and other wild lands is that we are never entirely sure what new ecological 
patterns or even new life forms might emerge from them. This is surely part of what Henry Da-
vid Thoreau meant when he wrote, “In wildness is the preservation of the world.”55 And this, 
once again, is the very essence of the concept of emergence—the most wonderful and adaptive 
patterns are the ones that organize themselves. Stuart Kauffman waxes lyrical on this subject:
For what can the teeming molecules that hustled themselves into self-reproducing 
metabolisms, the cells coordinating their behaviors to form multi-celled organ-
isms, the ecosystems, and even economic and political systems have in common? 
The wonderful possibility . . . is that on many fronts, life evolves toward a regime 
that is poised between order and chaos.56
To the extent that collaboration is a form of democracy that has emerged in response to a 
relatively dysfunctional decision-making framework, we should not be too eager to confine its 
creative energy within the bounds of that very framework. Rather, we should pay the closest 
kind of attention to the ways in which this emergent phenomenon is manifesting its life-giving 
adaptability. By studying, documenting, and nurturing that adaptive capacity, we may dis-
cover some of the most exciting work yet to be done in both democratic theory and practice. 
55 Henry David Thoreau, “Walking,” The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 09, No. 56 (June 1862).
56 Kauffman, op. cit., p. 26.
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Where the ongoing emergence of collaborative democracy might lead is as inherently 
unknowable as any other emergent trajectory. But within complexity theory there are two 
related concepts that might give us a clue about where to look: attractors and fractals. Start with 
attractors. While it is true that, in a genuinely complex setting, it is inherently impossible to pre-
dict exactly which patterns (if any) will emerge, when patterns do start to emerge, they seem to 
congregate around certain literal or figurative points (“attractors”) in the operative landscape.57 
It may be that the congregation of so many collaborative efforts around place-based problems 
is an example of an emergent pattern around a specific attractor (in this case, place). This 
becomes especially intriguing if we consider a particular side effect of attractors: the phenom-
enon of fractals. 
Fractals may be thought of as “patterns within patterns within patterns.” Look on the 
surface of a sand dune, and you will see small sand dunes making up that surface, and even 
tinier dunes on the surface of the small dunes. Notice how often spirals appear in nature, from 
spiral nebulae to hurricanes to your draining bathtub. Complexity theory says that these forms 
play back and forth on one another: what happens at a large scale is related to what happens 
at a much smaller scale, but not in a Newtonian billiard-ball way. Rather, in this fractal form 
of emergence, new forms suddenly begin to emerge simultaneously, often on several different 
scales at once, the way crystals emerge within crystals in a super-saturated solution. Here is how 
one complexity theorist speaks of these fractal patterns emerging around “strange attractors”:
One of the unexpected patterns of order found in strange attractors is that they are 
self-similar. A self-similar system has the same basic pattern repeated at different 
levels. When you look at a picture of desert sands, you cannot tell whether you are 
looking at the sand from a distance of five meters or 500 meters. The picture could 
be a close up or a distant shot. The basic shape of the sand dunes looks similar at all 
distances. It is said to be “self-similar” or “scale free.” Its shape is similar to itself at 
different levels of viewing and no matter from what scale we look at the fractal it 
has a similar appearance.58
57 Ibid., 78.
58 http://complexity.orconhosting.net.nz/fractal.html (accessed June 3, 2011).
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There is one pervasive fractal pattern in nature that brings us squarely back to the analy-
sis of collaboration. All around the world, watersheds provide a ubiquitous example of how 
fractals look and operate.59 The language quoted above about sand dunes applies precisely to 
watersheds, in that major rivers represent exactly the same image as their tributaries, and those 
tributaries take precisely the same form as their own smaller tributaries. To paraphrase: When 
you look at a picture of a watershed, you cannot tell whether you are looking at the landscape 
from a distance of 5 miles or 50 miles. The picture could be a close up or a distant shot. The 
basic shape of the watershed looks similar at all distances.60
The arid West, which we are using as a case study for our analysis of collaboration, presents 
an intriguing historical snapshot of the relationship between watersheds, collaboration, and 
governance.61 John Wesley Powell, an acute observer of the West and later director of the U.S. 
Geological Survey, argued well over a century ago that, because of the aridity of the interior 
West, it would be especially important to organize human activity—including political juris-
dictions—according to the lay of the land and the particularities of the place, not according 
to an artificial, straight-line, square-cornered grid, or to top-down management from the East 
Coast. In 1878, Powell published his Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States 
in which he set forth a remarkably broad and complex set of interlocking recommendations 
about public policy for the region. Powell proposed that the grid system so familiar on Eastern 
landscapes be replaced by surveys based on topography, letting farms be as irregular in shape as 
they had to be to give everyone access to water.62 Powell went on to argue that these individual 
watershed-shaped homesteads would be much more likely to prosper if they joined together 
within their larger watersheds to form grazing and irrigation cooperatives. 
 
59 Kauffman actually uses watersheds as the metaphor by which he describes attractors. “We can roughly think 
of an attractor as a lake,” he writes, “and the basin of attraction as the water drainage flowing into that lake.” 
Kauffman, 78.
60 For a visual illustration of this idea, see the 2010 special issue of National Geographic and the associated map 
of watersheds around the world, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/04/water/water-animation (accessed 
June 3, 2011).
61 By “governance” we mean the style or method by which decisions are made and conflicts among actors are 
resolved.
62 John Wesley Powell, Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States, ed. Wallace Stegner (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1962), 38-57.
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These two seemingly unrelated elements—cooperation and watershed governance—appear 
in tandem throughout Powell’s work. Powell was convinced that these arid Western landscapes 
could not be inhabited (or at least could not be inhabited in what we would now call a sustain-
able way) without a high level of cooperation among the inhabitants—just as he was convinced 
that where water was at such a premium, societies, economies, and policies would have to be 
organized according to the way the water flowed. 
      Those who actually made the rules and fashioned the governing institutions for the West stead-
fastly ignored Powell—basically trying for over a century to fit the West into an undifferentiated 
pattern of national policies and programs, as if it were no different than anyplace else. Yet, be-
yond all possibility of prediction, the two strands of thought that were so often wound together 
in Powell’s work—the strands of cooperation and watershed organization—have in the last two 
decades acquired so much momentum throughout the West that they have begun to emerge as 
an incipient, alternative form of governance within the region. Watershed councils and other 
mechanisms of Western collaboration have become both increasingly effective and increasingly 
incompatible with the prevailing centralized and adversarial decision-making structures on 
the one hand, or with arbitrarily 
bounded political jurisdictions of 
the region on the other. In fact, 
this close connection between 
fractally organized geographies and 
collaboration applies not only 
to watersheds, but also to eco-
systems (such as the Greater 
Yellowstone Ecosystem and the 
Crown of the Continent) that 
sometimes span different water-
sheds. All these cases provide intriguing signs of the emergence of a new governance structure 
that might provisionally be denominated as “fractal federalism.”
To understand how this might manifest itself, consider the ecosystem often referred to 
as the Crown of the Continent, an area that covers 18,000 square miles of land in Alberta, 
British Columbia, and Montana (about twice the size of Massachusetts). 
John Wesley Powell, an acute observer 
of the West . . . was convinced that 
where water was at such a premium, 
societies, economies, and policies would 
have to be organized according to the 
way the water flowed.
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Starting at the smallest geographic scale, there are at least 20 watershed groups in the 
Crown, most of them initiated and convened by citizens. These watershed groups create build-


















































Recall, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge, the landowner-based group in Montana that 
helps to coordinate the management of the Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent public 
and private lands. The Challenge is organized locally, but known nationally as a model for pre-
serving the rural character, ecological health, and natural beauty of its watershed. It supports 
environmentally responsible resource stewardship through cooperation of private and public 
interests. Private landowners, federal and state land managers, local government officials, and 
corporate landowners compose the informal membership. All share a common vision of how 
the Challenge operates in the Blackfoot watershed and all believe that success is most likely to 
result from building trust by working together.
The Blackfoot Challenge has produced an impressive list of accomplishments over the 
years. It is a good example of how place-based collaborative efforts often “nest” fractally within 
one another, since the watershed lies within the much larger Crown of the Continent. During 
the past eight years, a number of independent and complementary initiatives (including the 
Blackfoot Challenge) have emerged to promote conservation and community stewardship in 
this remarkable landscape. 
In response to a daunting mix of complicated issues, individuals and organizations through-
out the Crown are rising to the occasion and creating new forms of democratic practice. In a 
formal sense, the Crown of the Continent includes two nations, two provinces, and one state, 
with more than 20 government agencies exercising some type of authority and management of 
the landscape. While each of these expert-driven institutions plays an important role in manag-
ing natural resources, most of the issues facing the Crown present themselves at a spatial scale 
that crosses jurisdictional and cultural boundaries. While the formal legal and institutional 
boundaries delineate ownership and management authority, they also act as dividers between 
disparate cultures, attitudes, goals, and values. Such divisions stymie efforts to address shared 
challenges in an effective manner. People who care about the Crown and its future are increas-
ingly looking to bridge these jurisdictional and cultural barriers to address the challenges they 
collectively face at the spatial scale on which they occur. What is occurring, in fact, is a nested 
system of political arrangements where people with vision, passion, and capacity are creating 
new opportunities to name issues, frame options, and take action. 
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In response to a daunting mix  
of complicated issues, individuals  
and organizations throughout  
the Crown are rising to the  
occasion and creating new forms  
of democratic practice. 
At least nine independent and complementary initiatives have emerged since 1994 to 
promote and support problem solving at the scale of the Crown itself. While none of these 
initiatives has any formal authority to make and implement decisions, they each play a critical 
role in exchanging information, building relationships, and exploring opportunities to work 
together. Along with the community-based partnerships, they help build the civic and political 
will to address complex natural resource and related issues that cannot be effectively addressed 
by any single community, stakeholder group, or government agency.
In 2006, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Center for Natural Resources and 
Environment Policy began convening a series of round tables to facilitate communication and 
understanding among these various initiatives 
and to explore opportunities to work together. 
The round tables create an informal, ad hoc net-
work of networks. 
Scaling up even further from the level of the 
Crown is the Yellowstone to Yukon Conserva-
tion Initiative (Y2Y), an effort to protect wildlife 
core areas and corridors across a 500,000 square 
mile landscape—nearly three times the size of 
California. Y2Y began as a network of biologists 
and conservationists who were concerned about 
populations of wildlife “blinking out,” generally on a northward trend. Today, Y2Y continues 
its networking function, but programmatically focuses on protecting key connectivity areas for 
wildlife—areas that currently harbor endangered species, such as the grizzly bear, while facing 
significant threats from habitat loss, invasive species, and, increasingly, climate change. While 
Y2Y focuses on wildlife corridors and connectivity, it works closely with private landowners, 
community leaders, and others to address a range of issues related to land use, community and 
economic prosperity, and wildlife management. 
These fractally nested examples of regional collaboration provide some important lessons 
about how democratic citizenship manifests itself in these place-based settings. The role of 
networking, for example, is crucial to this particular form of democratic practice. In an essay in 
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the Summer 2009 issue of the Kettering Review cited earlier, Margaret Wheatley and Deborah 
Frieze capture the fundamentally democratic, world-shaping role of this kind of networking:
Despite current ads and slogans, the world doesn’t change one person at a time. It 
changes as networks of relationships form among people who discover they share a 
common cause and vision of what’s possible. . . . We don’t need to convince large 
numbers of people to change; instead, we need to connect with kindred spirits.63
This describes precisely what has driven the emergence of the nested regional collaborations 
we have described here, from the scale of the Blackfoot Challenge to the Yellowstone to Yukon 
initiative. And, as Wheatley and Frieze explain, emergence is exactly what is at work here: “As 
networks grow and transform into active, working communities of practice, we discover how 
life truly changes, which is through emergence.”64 Wheatley and Frieze recognize the practical 
roots of this kind of collaboration: networks are based on self-interest. “People usually network 
together for their own benefit and to develop their own work. Networks tend to have fluid 
membership; people move in and out of them based on how much they personally benefit 
from participating.”65 But out of this complex web of interactions, something unexpected of-
ten appears. As people exchange ideas, learn together, and develop a common sense of purpose, 
“suddenly and surprisingly a new system emerges at a greater level of scale.”66
The enticing possibility is that this nesting of networked, collaborative initiatives will evolve 
into new forms of governance. Wheatley and Frieze describe a frequent phase in the process 
of emergence characterized by “the sudden appearance of a system that has real power and 
influence. Pioneering efforts that hovered at the periphery suddenly become the norm.”67 
This aspect of emergence has profound implications for regional entrepreneurs. By better 
understanding the emergent properties of nested, place-based collaborative efforts in a locale 
like the Crown of the Continent, individuals and organizations will be better positioned to 
mobilize the political power to facilitate lasting change. Coincidentally, they will also develop 
63 Margaret Wheatley and Deborah Frieze, “Using Emergence to Take Social Innovations to Scale,” 




67 Ibid., 37, 34.
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and test new forms of governance and economic self-determination to think regionally and act 
at whatever spatial scale makes sense. 
These, then, are some of the governance implications that seem to be manifesting them-
selves in conjunction with the ongoing emergence of collaboration (especially place-based 
collaboration) as a democratic form. While it may be impossible to predict with any precision 
what new forms of democratic governance might actually emerge, it seems clear that the better 
we understand the dynamics driving these exciting and promising developments, the better 
positioned we will be to encourage those most likely to advance the cause of democracy.
What we have presented here is very deliberately intended as an exploratory piece of 
research. By its nature, the subject matter of emergence does not lend itself to a level of pre-
cision in analysis or prediction that another approach might offer. At a minimum, we have 
sought to clarify the place of collaboration within the ecology of democracy. Focusing on 
citizen-initiated, place-based collaboration, we have attempted to elucidate its relationship to 
other forms of democracy—representative, direct, procedural, and deliberative. We have also 
drawn on our experience with place-based collaboration to suggest some new forms of demo-
cratic governance that seem to be emerging in conjunction with  collaboration.
Given the open-ended nature of this undertaking, we inevitably conclude with several out-
standing questions, among them:
•  What kind of challenges present themselves as one moves up the geographic 
scale? Is the practice of collaborative democracy limited in some way by geo-
graphic scale and by the corresponding sense of place or of belonging? 
• How (if at all) does collaborative democracy address the issue of mobilizing 
and engaging unaffiliated citizens? This may be one of the links to both direct 
and deliberative democracy. 
• What kind of leadership skills are needed for collaborative democracy?68 
 68 This very important topic is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. For an incisive examination of one 
dimension of the subject, see R. S. Morse, “Integrative Public Leadership: Catalyzing Collaboration to Create 
Public Value,” The Leaership Quarterly, Vol. 21, Issue 2 (April 2010): 231-245.
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